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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, it has become rather evident for the central banks
of most, if not all, developed economies that as long as there are no signs
of recession in the horizon the objective of achieving and/or maintaining
price stability outranks their other statutory objectives, such as reduc-
ing unemployment or stimulating growth. Svensson (2001) argues that
dening price stability boils down to establishing a monetary policy loss
function and in turn maintaining price stability involves minimizing the
policy makers loss function.
While it is easy to show that under a quadratic loss function and
linear policy constraints, the optimal interest rate rule is a linear func-
tion of state variables, the estimated coe¢ cients are a convolution of the
parameters describing policy preferences and the underlying economic
structure. Hence, the estimated policy rule is a reduced-form model,
which cannot be used to address questions concerning the policy for-
mulation process since it is inherently di¢ cult to interpret changes in
the optimal reaction function. In other words, it averages out changes
in the estimated parameters of the optimal reaction function although
such changes could arise due to very di¤erent factors such as a shift in
policy preferences, or a change of the central banks targets, or due to
a reduction of the exogenous shocks, or a more e¢ cient implementation
of the monetary policy.
In this spirit, a large body of research tries to identify the reasons
behind the great moderation, the greater stability of output and ina-
tion in the 1980s and 1990s, the most common of which involve better
monetary policy, structural changes of inventory management and good
luck. However, potential changes of policy preferences seem to have
been ignored. A small albeit pivotal strand of the relevant literature
(Cecchetti et al. 2002; Cecchetti, 1998; Dennis 2006; Favero and Raveli,
2003; Ozlale, 2003) has endeavoured to actually obtain estimates of the
so-called deep factors such as policy preferences. The key and intuitively
plausible assumption that is underlined in all these studies is that over
time policy preferences are expected to change and with them the mon-
etary policies of central banks. For this reason, they provide estimates
of the changes in the monetary policy preferences typically by splitting
the samples into di¤erent periods often using structural breaks and sta-
bility tests. One of the main disadvantages of this approach is that in a
forward looking model agents form expectations accounting for possible
parameter changes in the future. The rationale is presented in Davig and
Leeper (2007) and Cooley et al. (1982).1 In this paper, we introduce an
1These papers show that the theoretical norm, which follows Lucas (1976) in
2
approach that allows for economic agents to form expectations that also
account for possible parameter changes in the future.
In particular, we adopt the Markov Regime Switching (henceforth
MRS) technique so as to make state dependent both the policy makers
loss function and the optimal policy rule that emerges from it. In the
same spirit, Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) provide a convincing argu-
ment as to why the loss function of a central bank should depend on the
state that the economy is in. They use a loss function the implication
of which is that the central bank is more reactive to ination, or alter-
natively to output-gap, with deviations from their target level occurring
when the economy is in expansion rather than in recession. Beck et
al. (2002) generalize this framework and assume a state dependent loss
function. Svensson and Williams (2007) and Blake and Zampolli (2010)
examine the impact of model uncertainty in the case of the optimal pol-
icy rule. Both of these studies assume a quadratic loss function subject
to state variables, the dynamics of which follow a Markov process2
We demonstrate empirically the usefulness of our approach by es-
timating the monetary policy preferences of the European Monetary
Union (EMU) countries and of the United Kingdom (UK), a selection
that is particularly interesting nowadays because recently the consensus
on optimal monetary policy has changed within a short period of time.
In fact, evidence of high ination and low economic growth before the
Lehmann Brothers collapse in September 2008 has raised a heated de-
bate as to whether the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of
England should focus on achieving their ination target or on promot-
ing economic growth by relaxing monetary policy at the expense of their
credibility in not pursuing the objective of price stability. Furthermore,
estimating the monetary policy preferences of the EMU and of the UK
becomes even more fascinating given that in the period after the col-
lapse of the Lehman Brothers the major central banks around the world
have reduced interest rates at historically low levels, shifting now the
debate on to the question of whether a loose monetary policy should be
coordinated with an expansionary scal policy.
From a general perspective, our approach can be viewed as generalis-
ing the framework suggested by Cecchetti et al. (2002) by allowing also
both policy preferences and the dynamic constraints faced by a central
treating regime shifts as a one-o¤ event rather than as an ongoing process, is logi-
cally inconsistent since agents form expectations that reect the belief that a regime
change is possible. We refer the interested reader to these papers for more in-depth
discussions of the topic. Sims et al. (2006) also present empirical evidence, which
supports the view that regime changes are not monotonic.
2Svensson and Williams (2007) use a model where central banks loss function is
regime dependent.
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bank to be regime dependent, e¤ectively changing across the business
cycle. To this end, we assume that policy makers minimize a regime
dependent quadratic loss function subject to the dynamics of state vari-
ables, which follow a Markov process. Subsequently, in this set up the
policy reaction function becomes state dependent. Our modelling ap-
proach is in line with Salemi (1995) and Sack (2000) who solve an opti-
mal control problem, where the dynamic constraints are estimated using
a linear VAR. In particular, following Blake and Zampolli (2010), we
estimate policy preferences by solving a dynamic programing problem
where the state-variables and shock variances are regime dependent.3
We may note that the framework employed by Blake and Zampolli
(2010) is very general and it does not facilitate the identication of what
drives regime shifts and knowing whether such shifts are the result of
level e¤ects (i.e. di¤erences across high and low levels of output and
ination); or policy changes; or changes in shock variances; or changes
in the propagation mechanism. We bypass this restriction by estimating
policy preferences based on regimes that are identied under four di¤er-
ent sets of assumptions. In particular, we estimate a model where only
the mean is allowed to change across di¤erent regimes; then a model
where only the variance of reduced-form shocks takes state dependent
values; then a model where only the autoregressive parameters change;
and nally, a model where all parameters are allowed to change.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents
the theoretical framework of optimal monetary policy. Section 3 overviews
the econometric methodology used to estimate monetary policy prefer-
ences and, Section 4 discusses the data utilized and the empirical results
of the study. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Formalizing Monetary Policy Preferences
This section describes the estimation of central bankspolicy prefer-
ences. In particular, central banks face an optimal control problem
where the dynamics of state variables is assumed to be given by the
point estimates of a Markov-switching structural VAR (MS-SVAR). By
using the estimated structure and by assuming that the actions of central
banks are optimal, we can recover the objective function.
We begin with a simple static model that Cecchetti et al. (2002) uses
and then we introduce dynamics in line with Sack(2000). The advantage
of the simple static model is that it represents the medium-run response
and the trade-o¤ that central banks face, while the dynamic model esti-
3Blake and Zampolli (2010) solve an optimal control problem with Markov-
switching rational expectations. Note that here, we proxy expectation formation
with MS VAR, instead of solving a reduced-form rational expectations model.
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mates long-run policy preferences and allows us, amongst other things,
to test for the robustness of the results we obtain from the static model.
Note that unlike Cecchetti et al. (2002) and Sack (2000), who use a
linear VAR model to account for the dynamics of state variables, we use
a Markov regime switching model.
Our approach is close to the methodology suggested by Blake and
Zampolli (2010), who rst solve a Markov switching reduced-form ra-
tional expectations model, and based on this solution they produce an
optimal time consistent policy rule. The key di¤erence between our
study and that of Blake and Zampolli (2010) is that in the rst step
instead of solving a Markov switching reduced-form rational expecta-
tions model, we use a reduced-form MS-VAR model to proxy economic
dynamics and market expectations. However, in the second step and in
line with Blake and Zampolli (2010), we choose an optimal policy rule
consistent with the rule obtained in the rst step.
2.1 Estimation of Policy Preferences: The static
case
We follow Cecchetti et al. (2002) and derive the trade-o¤ between ina-
tion and output gap variability by assuming that a central bank mini-
mizes a quadratic loss function (QLF), which is subject to linear demand
and supply curves:4
Lt = E[(t   )2 + (1  )(yt   y)2] (1)
yt = (it   dt) + st;  < 0 (2)
t =  (it   dt)  st (3)
where  is ination,  = E() is the ination target set by a central
bank, y denotes output gap, y = E(y) is the target of output gap
and it is the short-term nominal interest rate. The coe¢ cient  is the
weight that the central bank attaches to ination relative to output
stabilization,  is the inverse slope of the supply curve and  is the
slope of the aggregate demand curve; dt and st stand for the demand
and the supply shocks respectively. In this framework,  represents the
medium-run trade-o¤ between ination and output-gap variability.
Cecchetti et al. (2002) show that the parameter of policy preferences
is given as a function of the unconditional variances of ination (i.e. 2)
4We begin by assuming that a central bank minimize a contemporaneous rather
than a discounting sum of square deviations of output and ination from their re-
spective target.
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and output gap (i.e. 2y) and the estimated value of  :
5
2y
2
= [

(1  ) ]
2 (4)
Equation (4) has the property that for  = 0 (the central bank only
cares about output-gap variability), 2y=
2
 = 0. Likewise, for  = 1 (the
central bank only cares about ination variability), 2y=
2
 =1:We can
trace out the entire output-ination variability frontier by allowing  to
vary between 0 and 1.
We extent the model presented in equations (1)-(3) to a regime
switching framework and we obtain a state dependent version of (4),
as in (5):
2y(St)
2(St)
=

St
St(St   1)
2
(5)
Equation (5) shows that given the unconditional values of 2y(St) and
2(St) the policy preferences of the central bank change as the slope of
supply (1=St) curve changes across di¤erent regimes.
6 Estimates of pol-
icy preferences by Checchetti et al. (2002) are based on the assumption
that the VAR parameters remain constant over a signicant historical
period. However, in the case of the EMU, policy went through di¤erent
regimes. This implies that we need to adopt a statistical model, which
accounts for regime changes. Here, we estimate (5) by employing the
MS-SVAR suggested by Ehrmann et al. (2003). In line with Cecchetti
et al. (2002) we compute the inverse slope 1=(st) at each regime as the
12-quarter average of the impact of policy shock on output, divided by
the 12-quarter average impact on ination.
2.2 Estimation of Policy Preferences in a Dynamic
Model
We follow Sack (2000) in an attempt to make the analysis more realistic
and we introduce dynamics in both demand and supply curves. Sack
(2000) solves for an optimal policy rule that minimizes a quadratic loss
function subject to dynamics as implied by the VAR estimates. However,
we allow policy preferences and economic dynamics to change across the
business cycle. Thus, the policy maker minimizes a quadratic intertem-
5For the derivation of (4) see the appendix.
6For the derivation of (5) see the appendix.
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poral regime-dependent loss function:7
1X
t=0
tL(zt; St) =
1X
t=0
tEt[z
0
tR(St)zt] (6)
subject to:
zt=
pX
i=0
Ai(St)zt i+
pX
i=0
Bi(St)it i+vZt (St) (7)
it=
pX
i=0
Ci(St)zt i+
pX
i=0
Di(St)it i+v it(St) (8)
where zt = [yt t]0, R(St) is the regime-dependent matrix of the weights
attached to ination and output-gap stability and it is the policy in-
strument. The interaction between the structure of the economy and
the policy reaction function would generate an identication problem.
We get around this problem by estimating (7) and (8) using a Markov-
switching structural VAR (MS-SVAR) model. In doing so we impose, in
each regime, the same recursive structure used by Sack (2000). In partic-
ular, we assume that the relevant policy instrument does not enter into
the ination and output equations contemporaneously (i.e. B0 = 0). We
also impose the restriction that ination does not a¤ect output contem-
poraneously.
To solve the optimization problem we construct a state vector, which
includes current and lagged values of non-policy variables zt and lagged
values of the policy variable it as follows:
Xt= [zt; zt 1;:::; zt p+1; it 1; it 2; :::it p]0
= [yt; ::yt p+1; t; :::; t p+1; it 1; :::it p+1; it p]
The optimal policy will be a solution to the following Bellman equation:
V (X t; St = i) =maxit

X 0tR(St)X t+E t[V (X t+1; St+1 = j)]
	
(9)
subject to
Xt+1= C (S t) + A(St)X t(St)+B(St)i t+t (10)
where V (X t; St = i) is the continuation value function of the dynamic
programing problem at time t written as a function of the state vector
Xt and the unobserved variable St: The random variable St is assumed
to form a Markov chain in  = f1; 2; :::Ng with transition probability
7A regime-dependent loss function captures the possibility that future policy mak-
ers may have di¤erent policy preferences from their predecessors. For an analysis of
changes in the monetary policy objective see Debortoli and Nunes (2008; 2014).
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matrix P = (pij)0ij =2: The transition probability pij is the probability
that the economy switches from the current state i to future state j. We
assume that the policy makers know the current state of the economy
but they are uncertain about the future state.8 The following matrices
A and B depend on the value of the unobserved state variable St; and
for i 2 f1; 2; ::Ng; they are given by
C =
26666666666666666664
cy
0
:
0
c
0
:
:
:
:
:
0
37777777777777777775
; A=
26666666666666666664
a1yy ::: a
p 1
yy a
p
yy a
1
y a
2
y ::: a
p 1
y a
p
y b
2
yi ::: b
p 1
yi b
p
yi
1 ::: 0 0 0 ::: 0 0 0 ::: : 0
: ::: : : : ::: : : : : : :
0 ::: 1 0 0 ::: 0 0 0 ::: : 0
a1y ::: a
p 1
y a
p
y a
1
 a
2
 ::: a
p 1
 a
p
 b
2
i ::: b
p 1
i b
p
i
0 ::: 0 0 1 0 ::: 0 0 0 ::: 0 0
0 ::: 0 0 0 1 :::: : : : ::: 0 0
0 ::: 0 0 0 ::: 1 0 0 ::: 0 0
0 ::: 0 0 0 0 ::: 0 0 0 ::: 0 0
0 ::: 0 0 0 ::: 0 0 1 ::: 0 0
: ::: : : : ::: : : : ::: 0 :
0 ::: 0 0 0 ::: 0 0 0 ::: 1 0
37777777777777777775
and B =
26666666666666666664
b1yi
0
:
0
b1i
0
:
0
1
:
:
0
37777777777777777775
where the coe¢ cients akjl, for k = 1; :::; p   1, indicates the impact of
non-policy variable l on non-policy variable j , bkli shows the impact of
the policy instrument on the non-policy variable l and cl is the intercept
of the non-policy variable l.9 The superscript k show the lagged value
of the relevant variable.10
Given the linear quadratic nature of the problem and assuming fur-
ther that the value function is quadratic, i.e. V (X t; St = i) = X
0
tViXt+
2X 0t! + di; the rst order conditions will give a set of decision rules of
the following form:
it(zt; i) =  FiXt (11)
where
Fi = 
NX
j=1
pij(B
0
jVjBj)
 1
NX
j=1
pij(B
0
jVjAjXt +BjVjCj +Bj!j) (12)
8Note that the current state of the economy is given by the lter probability
P (St = ij	t); where 	t is the information set available at time t. For details con-
cerning the computation of lter probability see Hamilton (1994).
9The subscripts i; j used in akjl and b
k
li are not the same as those used in the
transition probability pij .
10 Note that we compute the C;A and B by using the point estimates from the
MS-VAR.
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Vi = Ri + 
NX
j=1
pij(A
0
jVjAj)  
NX
j=1
pijA
0
jVjBj(B
0
jVjBj)
 1B0jVjAj (13)
and
!i =
 
I   
NX
j=1
pijA
0
j[I  Bj(B0jVjBj) 1B0j]
! 1

NX
j=1
pijA
0
jVj[I Bj(B0jVjBj) 1B0jVj]Cj
(14)
for i; j = 1; 2, (11) and (13) can be written as follows:11
Fi= 
2X
i=1
pi1(B
0
1V1B1)
 1
2X
i=1
pi1(B
0
1V1A1Xt +B1V1C1 +B1!1) +

2X
i=1
pi2(B
0
2V2B2)
 1
2X
i=1
pi2(B
0
2V2A2Xt +B2V2C2 +B2!2)
Vi=Ri + 
2X
i=1
pi1(A
0
1V1A1)  
2X
i=1
pi1A
0
1V1B1(B
0
1V1B1)
 1B01V1A1 +
+
2X
i=1
pi2(A
0
2V2A2)  
2X
i=1
pi2A
0
2V2B2(B
0
2V2B2)
 1B02V2A2
The optimal decision rule (11) depends on the uncertainty concerning
which regime will prevail in the future.12 However, the response coef-
cients given in (12) are independent of the variance-covariance matrix
i of the zero-mean disturbances t. Thus, with respect to t, certainty
equivalence holds but not with respect to the matrices of the stochastic
parameters. Equation (11) and (13) can be solved by substituting the
former into the latter and then iterating the resulting Riccati equation to
converge, thereby obtaining a solution for Vi. Once we obtain a solution
for Vi; Fi can be determined recursively.
The optimal policy rule in (11) is a function of ; ,  and y:
In the results that follow, we assume that  = 0:99,  = 2 and y is
equal to the sample mean of output growth. For any choice of (St) the
optimal policy rule can be calculated. We compute the optimal weights
(St) by minimizing the distance between the optimal policy rate and
the actual rate where the distance is measured as the residual sum of
squared deviations.
11In a similar way we can write !i:
12This is reected in equation (12) by the transition probabilities pij :
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3 Econometric Methodology
A key input in estimating policy preferences for the static dynamic model
is the point estimates of a MS-SVAR model.13 MS SVAR is a two-
step procedure combining two important developments of VAR analysis:
Markov regime-switching and identication. In the rst step we estimate
a reduced-formMS VARmodel, where we allow all estimated parameters
to be state dependent:
Xt = c(St) +
pX
j=1
A(St)Xt j +B(St)ut (15)

(st) = E[B(St)utu
0
tB(St)
0] = B(St)u(St)B(St)0 (16)
where
Xt =
0@ytt
it
1A ; c(St) =
0@c1;stc2;st
c3;st
1A ; u =
0@u1;stu2;st
u3;st
1A ;
In the second step, we identify the impulse matrix B(st); which can be
used to extract the contemporaneous interactions among the elements
of Xt. Identication of B(st) requires n2 restrictions within each regime.
Estimation of 
(st) provides [n(n + 1)=2] restrictions. Thus, full iden-
tication requires another n(n   1)=2 extra restrictions. Sims (1992)
derives these restrictions by ordering endogenous variables recursively.14
We choose the recursive form of identication by imposing the restriction
that the policy instrument does not enter into the ination and output
equations.15 We also impose the restriction that ination does not a¤ect
output contemporaneously.
The model in (15) and (16) allows all the parameters to be a¤ected
by regime shifts. In such a setup, it is not clear what distinguishes the
di¤erent regimes. In particular, it is not clear if changes of the unob-
served state variable are associated with the phase of business cycles (i.e.
switches in the intercept), with changes in the propagation mechanism
(i.e. changes in the dynamic structure of the autoregressive MS-VAR
coe¢ cients) or with the changes of the MS-VAR errors (i.e. changes
in the variance of innovations). To examine the impact of the possible
13Note that we compute St in (5) by using the regime-depedent impulse responses
of output and ination to interest rate shocks. Alternatively, point estimates of the
reduced-form MS-VAR are used as an input in (10).
14In this set up, endogenous variables are ordered and it is assumed that the
fundamental disturbances have contemporaneous e¤ects on the variable in question
itself and on all the other variables below it.
15The same recursive identication scheme has been used by Ehrmann et al. (2003).
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sources of regimes shifts, we estimate four di¤erent models. The rst
model, presented in (15) and (16), accounts for the joint contribution of
all potential factors. We denote this general model as model A.
Then, we estimate a model under the assumption that only the in-
tercepts change across regimes, while the autoregressive parameters and
the variance covariance matrix of reduced-form shocks remain constant.
In this setup regimes are identied as low and high growth and high and
low ination. We call this model as model B:
Xt = c(St) +
pX
j=1
AjXt j +But (17)

 = BuB
0 (18)
Note that the impact matriceB remains constant across di¤erent regimes
(i.e. B(St) = B): Therefore, the impulse responses are not a¤ected by
changes of c(St) and policy preferences as computed by (5) in the static
model are independent of regime shifts. However, this is not the case
for the dynamic model where the optimal weights (St) as extracted by
the Riccati equations in (13) are still regime-dependent.16 For example,
in (11)-(14), even if the impact matrix is time-invariant (i.e. Bj = B),
the matrices of optimal reaction and the value of functions (i.e. Fi; Vi)
are functions of regime-dependent matrices such as Cj, Aj; and Ri. If
the static model is true then we do not expect, in the dynamic model,
policy preferences to change across the di¤erent states of the unobserved
variable St.
Then, and in line with the main bulk of the literature on great mod-
eration, we assume that regime changes are driven by better luck. We
consider a MS-VAR model where regime shifts are conned to the vari-
ance of structural innovations while the impulse matrix B is invariant
across the states of St.17 Thus, in the static model, policy preferences
remain unchanged across di¤erent regimes. We call this model, model
C:
Xt = c+
pX
j=1
AjXt j +But (19)

(St) = Bu(St)B
0 (20)
16This is because the inputs of Riccati equations were extracted from the reduce-
form MS-VAR. In particular, the impulse matrix B identied in the MS-SVAR is not
used in the case of the dynamic model.
17This approach resembles the ones suggested by Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and
Sack (2003) for identication of structural VAR through heteroscedasticity. However,
the authors assume that changes in the covariance structure occur at xed points
during the sample period.
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Lanne et al. (2010) show that identication of B can be achieved if:

(St) = BB
0 for St = 1
and

(st) = B(St)B
0for St = 2; :::; N
where (St) is a diagonal matrix with positive elements. If there are only
two regimes (i.e., St = 1; 2 ) identication requires that the elements of
(St) are distinct. Model C has been used in the great moderation
literature to test the null hypothesis of good luck.
Finally, we estimate a model where only the propagation mechanism,
as computed by the autoregressive matrices is subject to regime shifts:
Xt = c+
pX
j=1
A(st)Xt j +But (21)
We call equation (21) model D. Note that the autoregressive parame-
ters reect both the formation of market expectations and structural
relationships among economic agents. However, the economic behavior
of market agents described by the impulse matrix B is assumed to be
constant across regimes. Thus, changes in the propagation mechanism
are driven by changes in market expectations.18 Model D indicates the
impact that changes in the formation of market expectations have on
policy preferences.
4 Data and Empirical Results
This section discusses our empirical results concerning both the static
and dynamic models. We focus on the cases of the euro area and of
the UK. In what follows we utilize a trivariate MS VAR model, which
includes the policy instrument, ination and output growth. We allow
both the VAR coe¢ cients and the coe¢ cients of variance covariance
matrix to vary across states. We also employ a four-variable model by
adding the spread between the 6-year long-term and 3-month short-term
interest rate into the trivariate model. We include the spread between
long-term and short-term interest rate as the proxy for market expec-
tations. We use on a monthly basis the three-month treasury bill rate
as a proxy for the policy instrument. The treasury bill rate is avail-
able both for all countries used to construct the euro area series and
18A usefull servey of the propagation (i.e. persistence) literature are available in
Stock and Watson (1988), Pesaran and Lee (1993) and Pesaran et al. (1993). See
also Pivetta and Reis (2007) for changes in ination persistence and monetary policy
and Pancrazi and Vukotic (2013) for changes in output percistence and monetary
policy.
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for the whole period of investigation.19,20 We also use monthly CPI and
industrial production to construct the ination rate and the industrial
production growth rate.21
4.1 Estimation of Policy Preferences: The Case of
the Static Model
We compute the policy preferences and the slope of the supply curve
for the period March 1979 to August 2008.22,23 Figure 1 shows the lter
probabilities of regime 1 for model A. In line with empirical regularities,
the probability of regime 1 in EMU is low for the period before 1986
where eleven realignments took place. The probability of regime 1 is
also low in 1990 when the German unication took place and the low
economic growth in EMU emerged.24 The probability of regime 1 falls
during the speculative attacks in 1992, 1993 and 1995. Thus, the lter
probabilities provide strong evidence that regime 1 is associated with
the high growth and low volatility regime.
Similarly, in the UK the probability of regime 1 is broadly in line with
evidence produced elsewhere. Specically, Benati (2008) shows that the
long-run response to ination was weaker for the period before 1979-1990
and there was a marked increase under the Thatcher administration.
There was also a further increase after the introduction of the October
1992 ination targeting regime.25 Thus, the probability of regime 1
19Euro area data are constructed as a weighted average of seven EMU countries.
Namely, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Finland. Al-
though the aggregate GDP of these represents more than 92 percent of euro area
GDP, we scale the weight so that it represents 100 percent of euro area GDP. The
weights are taken from an updated vesrion of the Area-Wide Model (AWM) database
(see Fagan, Henry and Mestre 2001). In particular we use the following weights: For
Germany 0.362, for France 0.242, for Italy 0.165, for Spain 0.097, for the Netherlands
0.067, for Belgium 0.042 and for Finland 0.021.
20We could also use the short-term money market rate given by the 60b line of
International Financial Statistics (IFS) data base. However, it is only available for
the period before the introduction of the euro single currency.
21Data for CPI and industrial production were extracted from lines 64 and 99 of
the IFS data base.
22We exclude, in our analysis, the period after the recent nancial crisis because
of the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates problem.
23We have picked up the number of lags in the estimation of the reduced form
MS-VAR models using the Akaike Information Criterion.
24Both incidents raised doubts about the optimality of low ination policy pursued
by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
25Benati (2008), who, using a time-varying structural VAR analysis, shows that
there is violation of the Taylor principle during the 1980s, where the estimated long-
run ination coe¢ cient uctuates between 0.7 and 0.8. However, after the intro-
duction of the October 1992 ination targeting the long-run coe¢ cient on ination
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is low in periods where monetary policy violates the Taylor principle
by accommodating inationary pressures. Under such circumstances,
expected ination becomes self-fullling. This implies that if regime 1
coincides with active monetary policy then the level and the volatility
of ination is expected to be lower in regime 1 than in regime 2. The
probability of regime 1 is also low for the period between 2001 and
2003.26
Figures 2 and 3 are based on a trivariate MS-SVARmodel and present
the impulse response of ination to monetary policy shocks both for the
UK and for the EMU.27 There is some evidence of the price puzzle in
both regimes but it is a lot more persistent and stronger in regime 2. It
is worth noting at this point, however, that the price puzzle might be
an artefact of an omitted variable such as expected ination.28 Canova
et al. (2007) get round the omitted variable problem by using proxies of
expected ination.29 Here, we use as a proxy of expected ination the
spread between the six-year long-term interest rate and the three-month
treasury bill rate. However, the price puzzle is still somewhat present
even in the augmented four-variable MS-SVAR model.30 Evidence of the
price puzzle after accounting for expected ination indicates that either
the proxy of expected ination is not accurate or that the price puzzle
is due to supply shocks.31
In summary, although model A encompasses all potential factors,
which drive regime shifts, the lter probabilities and the impulse re-
sponse function provide evidence that regime 2 coincides with passive
monetary policy, self-fullling expectations, high ination and high volatil-
ity. At this point it is worth noting that the volatility changes could also
increased substantially reaching a value of 1.4.
26Groen et al. (2009) argue that there may have been temporary breaks induced
by the large volatilities in housing and energy market after 2000. Groen et al. (2009)
show, by developing a multivariate extension of the CUSUM test, that the UK RPI
ination was subject to structural breaks in 2001, 2003 and 2005.
27The condence intervals have been computed using bootstrapping. For more
details see Ehrmann et al. (2001) and the Appendix of this paper.
28If a VAR omits expected ination then the supposed monetary policy shock will
capture the positive correlation between ination and the relevant policy rate.
29Bernake, Boivin an Eliaz (2005) and Boivin, Giannoni and Mihov (2009) also
tackle the omitted variable problem by allowing some factors extracted by a large
dataset to enter into the VAR.
30For the sake of brevity we do not present the impulse response function of the
four-variable MS-SVAR model here. The relevant graphs are available from the
authors upon request.
31This is because the implication of the impulse response from a misspecied VAR
is similar to the implication of the response to a supply shock. This raises some
concern for the policy makers in distinguishing policy shocks from supply shocks,
especially for regimes with high uncertainty.
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come from two non-exclusive sources: changes of the unforecastable dis-
turbances and/or changes of how these disturbances propagate through-
out the whole economy. Below, we discuss how our results change
when we estimate the policy preferences by controlling for each potential
source of regime shifts.
The third and the fourth column of Table 1 presents the results from
the trivariate and the quadrivariate model A. The rst observation is
that most of the (St)s are very high. Estimated policy preferences
indicate that both the EMU and the UK put more weight on ination
stability, than on output growth stability, in the regime where the slope
of the supply curve (i.e. 1=) is steeper.32 Countries emphasize price
stability in regimes where the disination cost in terms of output growth
is low.
Next, the fth and the sixth columns of Table 1 present the results
from Model B in which only the intercept is allowed to change across
regimes. Although in this setup policy preferences are time-invariant,
the results are still comparable to those obtained from Model A. In
particular, the weights on ination are still high both for the EMU and
for the UK. However, for the EMU, while in the trivariate case the weight
on ination is lower than the relevant weights of Model A, it is higher in
the model that includes four variables.33 The results seem to be driven
by the slope of optimal policy frontier, which is atter for higher values
of :34 Thus, policy makers emphasize ination in regimes where the
trade-o¤ between ination and output growth variability is lower. For
the UK, ination has higher impact on policy makers loss function in
Model A than in Model B, which implies that it is not only the phase of
the business cycle that a¤ects the policy preferences but also changes in
the magnitude of the VAR forecast errors and/or changes of how these
disturbances propagate throughout the economy.
Then we turn to examine the impact that changes in the volatility
of forecast errors have on policy preferences. Columns seven and eight
present the results from Model C in which only changes in the volatility
of the forecast errors are allowed to change across regimes. We observe
that for the trivariate case the weights put on ination both for the
EMU and the UK are slightly lower than the average value of weights
estimated in Model A. However, for the extended model the importance
of ination on the policy makers loss function is higher in model C than
in model A. Note also that in model C the behaviour and expectations
32This implies a atter optimal policy frontier.
33In particular, we compare the weight on Model B with the average values of the
weights across regimes (i.e. 1 and 2) of Model A.
34In Model A, 1 and 2 are higher than  in model B.
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of economic agents, as reected in the impact matrix and in the auto-
gregressive coe¢ cients, are assumed to be invariant across the di¤erent
volatility states. Thus, in this setup, volatility changes are perceived as
structural breaks which the relevant literature often calls endogenous
to signify the fact that they are modelled. Our results indicate that
policy makers follow a policy against the wind: they respond to the un-
certainty concerning the variance of structural shocks by increasing the
weight they put on ination. We also observe that for the UK the slope
of the optimal policy frontier is almost at, which indicates that there
is no trade-o¤ between ination and output-growth.35
Finally, the last two columns of Table 1 present the results from
Model D in which only the propagation mechanism is allowed to change
across regimes. The results show very little support that this mechanisms
produces changes since not only is the weight on ination less than the
corresponding weights of Model A but also the results from the quadri-
variate EMU model are rather implausible. However, the lower weights
on ination in Model D, does not necessarily imply that the propagation
mechanism has no role on the switches of policy preferences. But it does
indicate at the very least that it is not the only factor.
Overall, the results from the static model imply that all factors are
likely to play a role in the di¤erence of policy preferences. However, it is
worth noting that the evidence from Model C underline more emphati-
cally the importance of ination as compared to the more exible Model
A. Thus, a key nding is that the uncertainty concerning the volatil-
ity of structural shocks might be the most important factor that yields
changes in policy preferences.
4.2 The Case of the Dynamic Model
The static model simplies the analysis by looking only at the medium-
horizon averages and by estimating the slope of the supply curve based
on impulse responses. However, evidence of price puzzle and question
marks about the ability of structural VAR to identify structural shocks,
demands further tests to robustify our inference.36 Thus, we adopt the
framework suggested by Blake and Zampolli (2010) and by recursive
35This is a rather strong result but the ltered probabilities show that it may
be attributed to the fact that the high volatility regime does not contain many
observations.
36Benati and Surico (2009) argue that there is a fundamental disconnection be-
tween what is structural within a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model and what is dened as structural based on the structural VAR representation
implied by the same DSGE model. Castelnuevo and Surico (2009) show that this ar-
gument is robust to an alternative identication approach based on sign restrictions,
which do not impose recursiveness.
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estimates of equations (11)-(14) we obtain an optimal policy path for
the policy instrument. In doing so, we compute the optimal weights by
minimizing the distance between the optimal policy rate and the actual
rate where the distance is measured by the residual sum of squared
deviations.
The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 2. For the gen-
eral Model A presented in the third and fourth columns, the results are
consistent with the basic results obtained from the static model; but
only for regime 1. Note that on the basis of lter probabilities and em-
pirical regularities, we argue above that regime 1 coincides with the low
volatility high growth regime. Thus, we observe that the weights put
on ination are high only for the low volatility regime. Similarly, the
striking nding is the very low weights on ination in the high volatility
regime. And although the low volatility regime is associated with the
high-growth period, evidence of low weights on ination is not consistent
with the results of Table 1 and the weights found in earlier studies that
used a linear framework. The key implication of our results is that in a
low growth regime, policy makers seem to switch policy preferences to
some extent from ination to output growth.
This is consistent with evidence from Model C where the weight put
on ination is low in both regimes. The low inuence of ination on
policy preferences might be due to the possibility of regime changes. For
example, expectations that the high volatility regime can appear again
in the future might a¤ect current policy preferences. However, the low
relative weight on ination is not consistent with results obtained from
the static analysis of Model C. The discrepancies between the static and
dynamic analysis might be due to the fact that the static analysis reects
the medium-run trade-o¤between ination and output-gap stabilization
while the dynamic analysis focuses on the long-run trade o¤. Estimates
fromModel B and D indicate that policy makers do indeed follow a policy
against the wind; they focus only on the stabilization of ination. The
only exception to this rule is Model D for the UK with four-variables,
where the weight put on ination is rather low in both regimes.
In summary, the results from the dynamic analysis seem rather mixed.
In the majority of the cases examined, policy makers appear to focus
mainly on ination stability. And unlike the overall picture drawn from
the dynamic analysis, Model C indicates that ination has low weight
on policy makersobjective function.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to estimate the monetary policy preferences of
the EMU countries and of the UK, which we undertake by building upon
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the framework suggested by Cecchetti et al. (2002) and extending it with
policy preferences that change across the di¤erent regimes. Specically,
we assume that the stochastic process of ination and output gap follows
a Markov process, and we estimate policy preferences rst for a model
with no dynamics in the demand and supply curves and second for a
more realistic model where dynamics are introduced. Moreover, we have
also examined the impact of the three main factors to determine the
source of the regime shifts, namely the di¤erent phases of the business
cycle, changes of the underlying propagation mechanism, and volatility
shifts of the structural shocks.
Our empirical results from the static model show that monetary pol-
icy makers in the EMU and in the UK put a lot of weight on ination
variability. The static analysis also shows that the main source of the
time variation of policy preferences is the volatility change of economic
disturbances. In the same vein, the dynamic analysis also provides ev-
idence that policy makers put a lot of emphasis on ination stability.
However, there are some notable exceptions. For example, in the high
volatility regime of the general model (Model A) the relative importance
of ination in the policy objective function is low. Also in line with the
static analysis, we observe that volatility shifts of economic disturbances
is the main factor to drive variations of policy preferences. But unlike
the static analysis, the weight that is put on ination stability is lower
for the model in which regime shifts are driven by volatility changes.
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Figure 1: Filter probabilities of the low volatility regime
Notes: the two graphs depict for the UK and the EMU the filter probability at each point in time
that the process is in regime 1; the complement of this gives the probability that the process is in
the other regime. 
Figure 2: Impulse-responses - UK inflation
Figure 3: Impulse-responses - EMU inflation
Regime 1
Regime 2
Regime 1
Regime 2
Notes: the impulse-response graphs depict for the first (Regime 1) and the second (Regime 2) volatility
regimes the response of inflation to a (positive) shock in interest rates. The upper and lower lines in
each graph are the 84% and 16% confidence intervals respectively obtained by bootstrapping. 
Notes: the impulse-response graphs depict for the first (Regime 1) and the second (Regime 2) volatility
regimes the response of inflation to a (positive) shock in interest rates. The upper and lower lines in
each graph are the 84% and 16% confidence intervals respectively obtained by bootstrapping. 
Table 1: Estimated policy preferences
based on static policy constraints
Table 2: Estimated policy preferences
based on dynamic policy constraints
Notes: the table depict the values of the γ and λ parameters for the trivariate and quadrivariate variants
of the four models namely Model A (the most flexible one), Model B (with the regime switching
mechanism affecting only the intercepts), Model C (with the regime switching mechanism affecting
only the variances), and Model D (with the regime switching mechanism affecting only the autoregressive
terms). The subscripts 1 and 2 indicate Regime 1 and Regime 2 respectively.
Notes: the table depict the values of the γ and λ parameters for the trivariate and quadrivariate variants
of the four models namely Model A (the most flexible one), Model B (with the regime switching
mechanism affecting only the intercepts), Model C (with the regime switching mechanism affecting
only the variances), and Model D (with the regime switching mechanism affecting only the autoregressive
terms). The subscripts 1 and 2 indicate Regime 1 and Regime 2 respectively.
UK EMU UK EMU UK EMU UK EMU
λ 1 97% 98% 99% 99% 99% 12% 99% 99%
λ 2 25% 17% 99% 99% 99% 12% 98% 99%
λ 1 99% 60% 99% 99% 40% 33% 22% 99%
λ 2 9% 26% 91% 99% 40% 24% 9% 99%
parameters
4 
variables
Model A Model B Model C Model D
3 
variables
UK EMU UK EMU UK EMU UK EMU
γ 1 -38.2 -2.6 -1.4 -3.1 -1.6 -2.6 -4.1 -2
γ 2 -2.3 -2 -1.4 -3.1 -1.6 -2.6 -0.1 -0.3
λ 1 99% 93% 88% 87% 89% 86% 90% 91%
λ 2 84% 91% 88% 87% 89% 86% 15% 63%
γ 1 -34.2 -1 -1.6 -1.7 -5.2 -75.9 -4.2 120.4
γ 2 -10.7 -0.6 -1.6 -1.7 -5.2 -75.9 -1.2 -0.02
λ 1 99% 84% 89% 78% 96% 99% 90% 100%
λ 2 96% 75% 89% 78% 96% 99% 72% 8%
3
variables
4
variables
parameters
Model A Model B Model C Model D
6 Appendix
6.1 Derivation of Optimal Policy Preferences for
the Static Model
The combination of the quadratic loss function, equation (1), and the
linear constraints, equations (2) and (3), yields a linear reaction function,
as in equation (22):
it = adt + bst (22)
Substituting this optimal policy relationship, equation (22), into equa-
tions (2) and (3), we obtain the respective variances 2y and 
2
. Thus,
we can write (1) in terms of 2y and 
2
: Then minimization of (1) yields:
a = 1 (23)
and
b =
(   )  
(1  2) + 2 (24)
Substituting (23) and (24) into 2y and 
2
 , it is easy to show that the
ratio 2y=
2
 is a function of the policy preferences ; and of the inverse
of the slope of the supply curve ; as in equation (25):
2y
2
= [

(1  ) ]
2 (25)
Using the unconditional values of 2 and 
2
y and the estimated value of
; we can infer the policy preference parameter . Equation (25) has the
property that for  = 0 (the central bank only cares about output-gap
variability), 2y=
2
 = 0. Likewise, for  = 1 (the central bank only cares
about ination variability), 2y=
2
 = 1: We can trace out the entire
output-ination variability frontier by allowing  to vary between 0 and
1.
There is empirical evidence (Hamilton and Lin, 1996; Ang and Bekaert,
1998) that macroeconomic variables follow a regime switching process.
Thus, we can also extent the loss function (1) to account for a state-
dependent Philips curve:37
Et[LtjSt;
t] = ptLe + (1  pt)LR (26)
Et[LtjSt;
t] = pt[e2 + (1  e)yt2] + (1  pt)[R2 + (1  R)yt2](27)
37For an analysis of changing monetary policy objectives see Debortoli and Nunes
(2008).
25
subject to (28) and (29):
yt = St(it   dt(St)) + st(St) (28)
t =  (it   dt(St))  st(St) (29)
where 
t is the information set available at time t; St is an unobserved
state variable at time t, pt indicates the probability for given 
t; St is
in expansion (i.e. P (S = ej
t), where the subscripts e and R indicate
that the relevant variables are in expansion and recession respectively.
In line with the linear model we can show the optimal policy frontier in
a state-dependant format, as in equation (30):
2y
2
=

St
St(St   1)
2
(30)
6.2 Bootstrapping
The procedure consists of ve steps:
1) Create a history for the unobserved state St: This can be
done recursively using the estimation of transition probability matrix P .
At each point of time we draw random number from the uniform distri-
bution [0,1] and compare it with the estimated transition probability to
determine whether there is regime switching.
2)Create history for the endogenous variables. This is done re-
cursively on the basis of estimated models presented in (17)-(21). All pa-
rameters are replaced by their estimated values and residuals are drawn
from a standard normal distribution ut~N(0; In): The di¤erent models
are then estimated recursively using the articial hidden state St gener-
ated above.
3)Estimation of MS VAR. Estimate a MS VAR using the articial
data generated in step one and two. Estimation gives bootstrapping
estimates of parameters presented in models (17)-(21).
4) Identication. Impose the same identifying restrictions on the
articial data as those imposed on the actual data. This step provides
bootstrapping estimates of the structural parameters.
5) Calculate the bootstrapping estimates of the response
vector. Compute the impulse response by substituting the bootstrap-
ping estimates of impulse and autoregressive matrices into the impulse
response functions.
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